Abstract-This paper presents a novel coding scheme for distributed storage systems containing nodes with adversarial errors. The key challenge in such systems is the propagation of the erroneous data from a single corrupted node to the rest of the system during node repair process. We present a concatenated coding scheme which is based on two types of codes: maximum rank distance (MRD) code as an outer code and optimal repair maximal distance separable (MDS) array code as an inner code. We prove that this coding scheme attains the upper bound on the resilience capacity, i.e., amount of data stored reliably in a system with a limited number of corrupted nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In light of exponential growth in the amount of data that is being generated, the issue of designing new storage mechanisms to handle this vast amount of data has grown as one of the primary challenges. The surge in the number of papers in this area over the past decade is a manifestation of the importance of this problem. With ever increasing size of items that need to be stored (e.g., HD videos, large databases) and distributed nature of origin and access locations of most of the content that is being stored, having a single storage location for a data item is neither feasible nor desirable. Distributed storage systems (DSS) alleviate this problem by storing the content over a network of nodes.
One of the main issues faced by DSS is resilience against node failures. If left uncoded, node failures may result in permanent loss of (a portion of) the data stored. Thus, coding is essential to instill resilience to node failures. Given the prevalence of single node failures in DSS (a user exiting a P2P system, power outage in a single data center in the cloud), a single node is repaired as soon as the node failure occurs in order to sustain the desired level of redundancy in the system. There are several reasons due to which instantaneous repair is desirable; one of which is to prevent permanent loss of data in the event of a catastrophic failure. In order to repair the failed node, data is downloaded from surviving nodes and a function of these is stored as the 'restored' node. The amount of data downloaded in this repair process is called the repair bandwidth. A naïve strategy for node repair is to download all data from surviving nodes to enable regeneration of the failed node. However, such an approach leads to a large repair bandwidth and consumes a vast amount of system resources (in terms of bandwidth and energy). Therefore, it is desirable to have a repair scheme that has as small a repair bandwidth as possible. In [1] , Dimakis et al. establish an information theoretic lower bound on repair bandwidth for MDS codes using min-cut analysis and show a trade-off between repair bandwidth and the amount of data stored on each node.
Functional repair is the one where the original failed node may not be replicated exactly, but to another that is functionally equivalent. [2] and [3] present storage schemes (i.e., codes) that achieve the lower bound on repair bandwidth. An alternative and rather desirable notion of repair is exact repair, where the regenerated data is an exact replica of what was stored on the failed node. The work in [4] , [5] , and [6] devise storage mechanisms, which under different restrictive settings (e.g., k < max(3, n/2)) achieve the lower bound derived in [1] . Recently, this result has been extended to more general settings by various researchers. [7] presents codes for DSS with two parity nodes, which accomplish exact regeneration while being optimal in repair bandwidth. In [8] and [9] , permutationmatrix based codes are designed to achieve the bound on repair bandwidth for systematic nodes repair for all (n, k) pairs. [10] further generalizes the idea of [9] to get MDS array codes for DSS that allow optimal exact regeneration for parity nodes as well.
While a majority of the work in DSS literature addresses the storage versus repair bandwidth trade-off, another important issue that has recently received attention is the design of storage schemes that ensure security and reliability of the stored content against adversarial errors [11] , [12] , [13] . It is the latter issue of inducing reliability against adversarial errors that we address in this paper. The dynamic nature of DSS due to node repair makes the issue of dealing with erroneous nodes non-trivial as a single corrupted node may subsequently corrupt a large portion of the DSS system by spreading the pollution during node repair. In [13] , Pawar et al. address the reliability issue in detail and derive upper bounds on the amount of data that can be stored on the system and reliably made available to a data collector when optimal node repair is performed. The authors consider two models for adversarial errors introduced in the storage nodes: 1) an omniscient adversary, who can observe all the nodes and knows the coding scheme employed by the system, 2) a limited knowledge adversary that can observe a maximum number of nodes throughout. In both error models, the adversary can control at most a fixed number of nodes and inject false information through these nodes during the entire operation of DSS. [13] also propose coding strategies that achieve the upper bound in bandwidth limited regime.
In this paper, we adopt the notion of omniscient adversary. As in [13] , we assume an upper bound on the number of nodes that can be affected. This upper bound is a system parameter that is used to design coding schemes to ensure reliable delivery of the original data to an end user, i.e., data collector. In addition, we classify adversarial attacks into two classes: 1) One-time errors: an omniscient adversary replaces the content of an affected node with nonsensical information only once. The affected node uses this same polluted information during all subsequent repair and data collection processes. 2) Dynamic errors: an omniscient adversary may replace the content of an affected node each time the node is asked for the data during data collection or repair process. This kind of attack is more difficult to manage in comparison to one-time errors. We present a novel concatenated coding scheme for DSS which provides resilience against these two classes of attacks. The scheme attains the upper bound on the amount of data that can be stored reliably in DSS [13] . In our scheme, the content to be stored is first encoded using a maximum rank distance (MRD) code, and the output of this outer code is further encoded using an optimal repair maximum distance separable (MDS) array code. Using an MRD code, which is an optimal rank-metric code, allows us to quantify the errors introduced in the system using their rank as opposed to their Hamming weights. Due to the dynamic nature of the DSS a large number of nodes can get polluted even by a single erroneous node, since false information spreads as a result of node repairs. Thus, a single polluted node can infect many others, resulting in an error vector with a large Hamming weight. Using rankmetric codes alleviates this problem as the error that a data collector has to handle has a rank at most the size of the data in the polluted nodes, and can therefore be corrected by an MRD code with a sufficient rank distance. Using an (n, k) bandwidth efficient MDS array code as inner code facilitates bandwidth efficient node repair in the event of a single node failure and allows the data collector to recover the original data form any subset of k storage nodes. In this paper, we use exact-regenerating bandwidth efficient codes operating at the minimum-storage regenerating (MSR) point [1] . However, our construction works for any regenerating code.
The proposed coding scheme is directly applicable to the one-time errors attack model. However, the model with dynamic errors is more complicated, as it allows a single malicious node to change its pollution pattern, thus introducing an arbitrarily large extent of error both in Hamming weight and in rank. In this case, we combine our concatenated coding scheme with the standard hash function based approach in order to control the amount (rank) of pollution (error) introduced by an adversarial node. Note that the use of hash functions has previously been presented in the context of DSS to deal with errors in [11] , [13] . While promising, hash functions provide only probabilistic guarantees for pollution containment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we first give a brief description of rank-metric codes along with Gabidulin MRD codes and the error model in rank-metric for these codes. Subsequently, we describe MDS array codes and present two examples of bandwidth efficient MDS array codes that are later used as inner codes in our construction. In Section III, we describe the construction of our storage scheme and prove its error resilience under the one-time error model. Further, we present a few examples to illustrate our scheme and prove that our codes attain the upper bound on resilience capacity. Finally, in Section IV, we briefly discuss the dynamic error model.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Rank-Metric Codes
Rank-metric codes were introduced by Delsarte [14] and rediscovered in [15] , [16] . These codes have applications in different fields, such as space-time coding [17] , random network coding [18] , [19] , and public key cryptosystems [20] . Our goal in this paper is to show that rank-metric codes are useful for error correction in distributed storage as well.
Let F q be the finite field of size q. For two N × m matrices A and B over F q the rank distance is defined by
An [N × m, ̺, δ] rank-metric code C is a linear code, whose codewords are N × m matrices over F q ; they form a linear subspace with dimension ̺ of F N ×m q , and for each two distinct codewords A and [15] , [16] . This bound, called Singleton bound for rank metric, is attained for all possible parameters. The codes that attain this bound are called maximum rank distance (MRD) codes.
1) Gabidulin MRD Codes:
An important family of MRD linear codes is presented by Gabidulin [15] . These codes can be seen as the analogs of Reed-Solomon codes for rank metric. T , where c i ∈ F q N , since F q N can be viewed as an N -dimensional vector space over
We will use this family of MRD codes in our construction of codes for distributed storage.
2) Rank Error Correction: Let C ⊆ F m q N be a Gabidulin MRD code with minimum distance δ. Let c ∈ C be the transmitted codeword and let r = c + e be the received word. The code C can correct any error e ∈ F m q N of rank t as long as 2t ≤ δ − 1. Note, that since rank(e) = t, we can write
. . .
where e i ∈ F q N are linearly independent over the base field F q and u i ∈ F m q are linearly independent vectors of length m. Decoding algorithms for rank-metric codes are provided in [15] , [21] . 
B. MDS Array Codes for Distributed Storage
αk , where k = n−d+1 [22] , [23] . Note, that an MRD code is also an MDS array code.
Let
q is a block of size α, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. These k blocks are encoded into n encoded blocks y i ∈ F α q , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, stored in n nodes of size α, in the following way:
where y = [y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ]
T and the generator matrix G is an n × k matrix of blocks of size α × α given by:
An array code C has an MDS property if any blocks submatrix of G of size k × k is of the full rank. In other words, if an (n, k) MDS code is used to store data in a system, and any set of n − k storage nodes fails, the original data can be recovered from the k surviving nodes. We say that an MDS code satisfies optimal repair property, if a single failed node can be repaired by downloading α/(n− k) elements from every surviving node [1] .
1) Examples of Optimal Repair MDS Array Codes:
In the following, we present two examples of the optimal repair MDS array codes for DSS, which we will use further for illustration of our coding scheme. Due to space constraints, we only describe the MDS codes used in the examples. For general constructions, interested readers may refer to the respective papers that present these codes.
Example 1: (5,3) Zigzag code [9] . This class of MDS array codes [9] is based on permutation matrices. For the (5, 3) Zigzag code presented in Fig. 1 where I and 0 denote the identity matrix and all-zero matrix, respectively. Fig. 1a describes node repair process for (5, 3) Zigzag code. When the second node fails, the newcomer node downloads the symbols from the shaded locations at the surviving nodes.
Example 2: (5, 3) Hadamard Design codes [7] . This class of MDS array codes employs interference alignment strategies in order to perform node repair. In the (5, 3) example presented in 
III. THE CONSTRUCTION
In this section we present our coding scheme and prove its error tolerance under the one-time error model. Let M ∈ F KN q denote a file of size KN . M is partitioned into K parts of size N each. We form an N ×K matrix M over F q , where the ith part of M forms the ith column of M, for all
q N be the codeword in C which corresponds to the information matrix M. Let α, k be positive integers such that m = αk. Let C be an (n, k) MDS array code of dimensions α × n. We partition the vector c M into k parts of size α and form n nodes of size α each, according to the encoding algorithm of the code C. Note, that we use an MDS array code over F q , i.e., its generator matrix is over F q , and during the process of node repair, a set of surviving nodes transmits linear combinations of the stored elements with the coefficients from F q .
The following theorem shows that our system tolerates up to t erroneous nodes, if 2tα + 1 ≤ δ.
Theorem 1: Let t be the number of erroneous nodes in the system based on concatenated MRD and optimal repair MDS array codes. If 2tα + 1 ≤ δ, then the original data can be recovered from any k nodes.
Proof: Let c M ∈ F m q N be the codeword in C which corresponds to the information matrix M, and let [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ], x i ∈ F α q N , be the partition of c M into k parts of size α each. Let [y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ], y i ∈ F α q N be the encoded blocks stored in n nodes.
Let S = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i t } be the set of indices of the erroneous nodes. Hence the i j th node, i j ∈ S, contains
denotes an adversarial error introduced by the i j th node. When the failed nodes are being repaired, the errors from adversarial nodes propagate to the repaired nodes. In particulary, an ℓth node, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, contains
where B T + Be, where B is the blocks matrix of size kα × tα over F q given by
T + B ′ e, where the block matrix B ′ ∈ F kα×tα q represents the coefficients of e obtained by the decoding of the code C. Since the rank of e over F q is at most tα, and δ ≥ 2tα + 1, the MRD code C can correct this error.
A. DSS Dynamics under One-Time Error Model
Now we demonstrate that the rank of the error introduced by an adversary does not increase due to node repair dynamics under the one-time error model. Hence, a data collector can recover the correct original information using a decoder for an MRD code. We present the case where an adversary pollutes the information stored at a single storage node. It is important to note that in our construction, any optimal repair MDS array code from DSS literature can be used as the inner code. In this subsection, we illustrate the idea of our construction with the help of two examples drawn from two different classes of optimal repair MDS array codes for DSS, presented in Section II-B1. T + [e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ] T . Now assume that the second node fails. The system is oblivious to the presence of pollution at the first node, and employs an exact regeneration strategy to reconstruct the second node. The reconstructed node downloads the symbols from the shaded locations at the surviving nodes, as described in Fig. 1b , and solves a linear system of equations to obtain [c 5 , c 6 , c 7 , c 8 ]
T , where 2 −1 denotes the inverse element of 2 in F q . Now assume that a data collector accesses the first three nodes in an attempt to recover the original data. The data collector now has access to c = c
T e, where
Note that c contains an error of rank at most four. Therefore, the original MRD codeword c and subsequently the original information can be recovered, using an MRD code with rankdistance at least nine. Example 4: Let C be a (5,3) Hadamard design based code, described in Example 2. Its first three nodes store
q N is a codeword belonging to a Gabidulin MRD code, which is obtained by encoding the original data. Suppose an adversary modifies the information stored at the first node to y 1 + e = [c 1 , . . . , c α ]
T + [e 1 , . . . , e α ] T . When the second node fails, a newcomer, unaware of the presence of error at the first node, employ the interference alignment based strategy described in Example 2 and depicted in Fig. 2 . After interference mitigation, a linear system of equations is solved to obtain y 2 + B 2 e. Assuming that a data collector contacts the first three nodes, it receives [y
T e which contains an error of rank at most α. This allows the recovery of uncorrupted information using an MRD code of sufficient minimum rank-distance.
B. Code Parameters
The upper bound on the amount of data that can be stored reliably in the system with t < k 2 corrupted nodes, called resilience capacity, was presented by Pawar et al. [13] . This bound is given by
where n is the number of nodes, k is the number of nodes sufficient for reconstruction of the source file, α is a storage capacity of each DSS node, and β is the amount of data downloaded from each of the n − 1 surviving nodes for the repair of a single failed node. The authors provided the explicit construction of the codes that attain this bound, for bandwidth-limited regime. However, this construction has practical limitations for large values of t since the decoding algorithm presented in [13] is exponential in t. The decoding of codewords in the construction presented in our paper is efficient since it is based on two efficient decoding algorithms: one, for an MDS array code, and two, for a Gabidulin code. Next, we show that our constructed codes attain bound (2) and thus, are optimal.
Let the parameters K, N, m, δ, α, k, n be as described in our construction. Then m = K + δ − 1 and m = αk. Let t be an integer such that δ = 2tα+1. Then αk = K +δ−1 = K +2αt, and hence K = α(k − 2t). Now we compare this result with the bound (2). Let C be an MDS array code with optimal repair property. Then β = α n−k . Therefore, we can rewrite bound (2) as follows:
Thus, our codes attain the bound (2).
IV. DYNAMIC ERRORS The coding scheme from the previous sections is not directly applicable to the dynamic errors model as even a single adversarial node may introduce heavy pollution with an arbitrarily large rank by producing different inconsistent outputs for different node repairs in which it participates. However, a timely detection of the inconsistency in the information, provided by a single node for node repair and data collection over time, can prevent the adversary from distributing too many errors through a single node, thereby bounding the rank of error. We leverage hash functions to detect inconsistencies and extend our scheme as follows. A strong cryptographic hash of the node content is stored in a verifier. A failed node is repaired using the data from other nodes without consulting the verifier. Note, that the repaired node may potentially contain erroneous data from the adversarial nodes. After the repair is complete, the restored node asserts the validity of the received information by sending the hash based signatures of the data used for the repair to the verifier. If any inconsistency is detected, the verifier initiates a forced repair of the nodes which produced the content with the inconsistent hash. Note that such a procedure (as studied in [11] ) can at best provide probabilistic guarantees.
